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Army Museums and Military History Education

James P. Finley

This the way to the Museyroom.
Mind your hats goan in!
—James Joyce, *Finnegan's Wake*

Individual visits to America's museums are now estimated at 300 million a year, six times the number of visitors thirty years ago. Attendance is growing faster than the population, as more and more people are following Joyce's Dublin docent into the museyroom. They are finding it a different place from what it was a generation ago. No longer the exclusive preserves of scholars and collectors, museums today cater to clientele as varied as the communities they serve. They hold out to visitors of all ages and backgrounds the promise of a rich visual and intellectual experience, one that will add perspective to their lives. As the Report of the Commission on Museums for a New Century put it,

Museums offer rich encounters with reality, with the past, with what exists now and with what is possible. They stimulate curiosity, give pleasure, increase knowledge. Museums acquaint us with the unfamiliar, coaxing us beyond the safety of what we already know. And they impart a freshness to the familiar, disclosing miracles in what we have long taken for granted. Museums are gathering places, places of discovery, places to find quiet, to contemplate and to be inspired. They are our collective memory, our chronicle of human creativity....

Although all these definitions and roles apply to Army museums, there are some important differences between museums in the military and civilian museums. What sets Army museums apart most strikingly is a pervasive misunderstanding of their missions and characters. All too often they are thought of as being nice-to-have visitor centers, trophy rooms or community relations activities, rather than as the vital training institutions they really are.

The largely misunderstood reality of Army museums is inextricably linked to the functions and usefulness of history, itself. Neither soldiers nor civilians would find much to disagree with in Secretary of the Army Marsh's comments in these pages that, "An understanding of history sharpens judgments

and broadens perspective. A knowledge of past campaigns and commanders provides vicarious experience otherwise unobtainable." For many in the military, however, this falls somewhat short of the mark. They want their history invested with visible, immediate practicality. Not satisfied with knowing what happened, they need to know why it happened and what use it is to them—and they need to know now. For most soldiers, history is not an armchair pastime to be pondered in wreaths of pipe tobacco. They would ask history to yield up its lessons clearly and smartly, lessons that can be translated into action.

Soldiers would agree, if they gave it some thought, with Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce, who saw history as "the act of comprehending and understanding induced by the requirements of practical life." Croce's historical philosophy is, to be sure, very involved, but basically he saw history as experience and experience as historical judgment. Every judgment we make in our lives is a historical judgment, and once we realize that our every judgment is dependent upon history, we come to see history in a new light. It becomes the deepest and grandest of disciplines, subsuming all others. When, in short, we adjust the sights on a rifle, we are making a historical judgment.



Exhibits in the Fort Huachuca Historical Museum, Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Is it worthwhile, then, for soldiers to visit museums, to study history? If we believe with Croce that there is a direct and immediate bond between historical knowledge and action, then we must answer that it is not only worthwhile—it is among the most valuable and practical things soldiers can do. An army without a sense of history, without an understanding of the moral purpose for which it fights, will be as effective as a grazing herd of cattle, not knowing how it got to pasture or where it will be tomorrow. Contented in its ignorance, it is eventually led to slaughter.

Army policy holds that "an Army museum is primarily for education." If military history is worth knowing, Army museums must become the focal points for its study at Army installations. The Army museum is the logical choice for the leadership role in fostering the study of history within the Army. It has the resources. Museum staffs are well-versed in the history of the Army and are eager to share their knowledge. Army museums often have libraries as part of their operations and can, at the very least, make available lists of recommended readings. Army museums can often provide research and reference services, and in some cases can loan slides, photographs, and videotapes. Soon Army museums will be equipped with computers that will enable students and researchers to make nationwide searches and locate vast amounts of military historical information. Army museums frequently have rooms for quiet contemplation or for small gatherings and discussions, rooms affording comfortable settings—informal and collaborative—rather than the charged, competitive atmosphere of classrooms.

Army museums have assumed greater and more positive roles in education. Usually educating informally, they are able to attract those growing numbers of adults seeking more knowledge about their history. The first stage in an Army museum's educational mission is to collect things, three-dimensional relics of bygone eras. Actual representative objects of our material culture create the aura of authenticity that helps the visitor to plug into the past. If the encounter with the past is to be firsthand, artifacts must occupy a central place in the museum's educational scheme. It is this allegiance to actual artifacts that differentiates the curator—who is also a designer and an educator—from the window-dresser.

The larger educational character of an artifact comes into being when the curator places it in a context that prompts the spectator's knowledge and feeling of the past. When an artifact is made to speak over decades to large numbers of learners, the museum is fulfilling its primary role and making its broadest impact.

Curators are artists; they intuit the ideas of the past and give them creative, concrete expression. Spectators share in the creative process by contemplation and appreciation, and eventually by making their own connections to the inner spirit of the past. The highest function of art can be said to be in the expression and communication of ideas. There is a certain beauty to be found in the combination of a curator's successful expression of history and a spectator's successful experience of it.

To dispel any lingering misapprehensions of what Army museums are, it is necessary to make clear what they are not—or should not be. Army museums are not storehouses of moth-eaten tunics carted in by curious descendants, nor are they final resting places of rusting military accoutrements. They are not waxed and polished galleries from the walls of which stare down dead heroes. Army museums are not—or should not be—bewildering successions of military memorabilia or woolly records of uniform changes. An Army museum is a record of human activity and the manifestation of the history of ideas and values—a place where history vibrates in the souls of the staff and visitors. Most importantly, an Army museum is an educational institution bringing to the Army, its people, and the public not just knowledge of but the experience of history.

This way to museyroom.
Mind your boots goan out.

James Finley is Museum Director and Post Historian, Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Call for Articles

The Army Historian is seeking articles of from 300 to 2,500 words for publication in future issues. Articles on such topics as Army historical activities, current research, the uses of military history and its position in the Army, past commanders' use of history, military historiography, programs promoting historical mindedness, and professional reading are being considered. Accepted submissions are edited for clarity and suitability, but every effort is made to preserve the authors' individual styles. Where possible, photographic prints related to the articles would be very helpful, and will be returned to authors of accepted manuscripts upon request. Manuscripts should be double-spaced, in two copies, accompanied by a daytime telephone number and a brief description of the writer's current position, and sent to Managing Editor, *The Army Historian*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20314-0200.

CHIEF'S BULLETIN

Patrick J. Holland

By the time this edition of *The Army Historian* is off the press, Col. William A. Stofft will have assumed the duties of Chief of Military History. He comes eminently qualified to the position. His undergraduate work was in American history, he holds a Master's in European history, and he has completed coursework for a Ph.D. in Russian history. Colonel Stofft held command and staff positions in Europe and the United States, and completed two tours in Vietnam. He served on the Army staff in Washington, working on officer education in the Office of the Chief of Staff, and is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College. He served two tours on the CGSC faculty as an instructor of military history and strategy, including five years as Director of the Combat Studies Institute. Colonel Stofft comes to the Center directly from an assignment as Assistant Deputy Commandant of the Command and General Staff College. I know I speak for everyone in the Army's historical and museum communities in welcoming him and wishing him well.

The ARMY HISTORIAN

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During the past months, I had a lot to learn. Everywhere I went, I encountered a spirit of helpfulness and dedication. It made my job easier, and I am deeply appreciative. The tasks we had before us when General Kinnard departed last November were fairly straightforward: to keep up the momentum achieved in Center historical publications, maintain contacts with the field, continue progress toward the realization of a National Museum of the United States Army, and perform smoothly our many responsibilities to the Army staff. Thanks to the efforts of people at all levels in the Center and the field, we have kept up the momentum on publications; architectural planning for the National Museum is proceeding apace; we've conducted two large conferences to bring the Center closer to curators and historians in the field; and our support to the Army staff, other agencies, and the public has continued unabated. With additional officers in our Research and Analysis Division, the Center has expanded its historical analysis function, with several publications due shortly. In addition, important steps have been taken to improve the posture of the Army's Military History Detachments, an issue USAREUR's Bill Stacy treats in this issue. A rational and pragmatic program for MHD employment in peacetime and in the event of an armed conflict should be in place this summer.

This past winter's two important conferences—the Thirteenth Annual Army Museum Conference, held in January in snowy San Antonio, Texas, and the Sixth Biennial Army Historians Conference, held in February in sunny Crystal City, Virginia—brought home to us two important lessons. These are that there are many talented professionals in the field who make the Army's museum and historical programs work, and that all of us have to do a better job communicating and coordinating our efforts with each other. Curators and historians, as James Finley's article in these pages makes clear, perform similar missions with different tools. We are seeking better interaction among this team in the future.

One of our principal responsibilities is to keep lines of communication with the field open, not just through conferences but routinely throughout the year. This publication is one such attempt. Also, field historians should see more visits from us and there will be more emphasis on the Annual Historical Review. In summary, the Army Historical Program is progressing toward more coherence. We are looking to the field for help in improving communications and interaction everywhere—up, down, and sideways—and to the readers of this publication for suggestions on how we can make history serve the Army.

THE COMMANDER AND MILITARY HISTORY

Capturing the Historical Record in a Future European Conflict

William E. Stacy

The U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), has been attempting to learn from history or, more precisely, from the historical record-collecting experiences of the U.S. Army during the last three wars. One of the lessons the Army has apparently not learned very well from past combat experiences is how properly to utilize military history detachments (MHDs) in wartime.

As Robert K. Wright outlined in his "Clio in Combat: The Evolution of the Military History Detachment" (*TAH*, Winter 1985), there has been an ongoing debate concerning the missions and control of MHDs. Simply stated, are MHDs a higher headquarters asset or do they belong to the commanders to whom they are assigned? A subsidiary issue is whether MHDs should emphasize historical data collection or analysis ("lessons learned").

During World War II, in the Korean War, and again in Vietnam, the Army wrestled with these issues. The pendulum swung between extremes of centralization and decentralization. In each case, quality of product ultimately depended upon the abilities of the detachments and the support they received from the units to which they were assigned. Dr. Wright concluded his survey of MHDs by calling for a reorganization of military history detachments that would enable them to provide "trained, professional historians working on the battlefield to support both the field commanders and their colleagues at the Center of Military History."

In planning for historical coverage of a possible European conflict, the USAREUR Military History Office has had to face several conflicting realities that preclude it from satisfying all interested parties. The first constraint is that there are simply not enough MHDs in the Active Army and Reserve Components to provide coverage down to the divisional and separate brigade levels. Plans call for the Center of Military History to train and dispatch additional units, which would allow the extensive coverage everyone wants. Unfortunately, just about every analysis of how a war in Europe would evolve emphasizes its speed and intensity; it is unlikely that there would be time to man, train, and deploy additional MHDs. To deal with this problem, current

plans concentrate several MHDs at selected headquarters, where they must attempt to cover a wide array of combat operations. It is probable that this arrangement would leave the Center dissatisfied with the limited amount of collected data it would receive, and the local commanders would be dissatisfied because they would not necessarily have trained "historical sections" to accomplish their various after-action, lessons-learned, and historical-reports requirements.

There is some measure of relief for this dearth of MHDs assigned to USAREUR. Although USAREUR's military history program is, especially in its full-time staffing, primarily civilian, there is a trend toward designating these historians "emergency-essential" personnel. In the event of war, they would remain behind to manage the program and aid in the collection of the historical record. USAREUR's historians are a very small group, however, and the major responsibility for gathering and preserving the historical record will remain with the MHDs and the part-time unit historians. Our primary wartime planning goal is to merge the assets capabilities of these three groups—full-time civilian historians, military history detachments, and part-time unit historians—into a rational structure that can best accomplish the wartime mission.

During REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) 85 earlier this year, USAREUR had the opportunity to refine these very generalized plans. When he dons his military cap, Dr. Wright is commander of the 116th Military History Detachment of the Virginia Army National Guard. In plans for the alignment of Reserve Components of the Army with active units in wartime, the 116th is "CAPSTONED" to USAREUR headquarters. USAREUR decided to give Captain Wright an opportunity to test his theories on the deployment of MHDs by involving him and his unit in "real-world" planning, and to attempt to implement as many of his proposals as constraints would allow. There were several factors making REFORGER 85 an opportune time to plan for wartime and contingency MHD operations. First, there was a coherent

structure already in being or planned for execution should war break out in Europe. In other words, the 116th MHD could have a pretty good idea what the theater structure would look like and how big the job was. Second, between the detachment and the USAREUR Military History Office there was a fund of Vietnam War experience, both in the operational and historical areas. Third, and perhaps most important, the 116th would be working with a major command that was determined to get the best possible fix on the problems with present and projected resources.

Initially, the 116th MHD had a limited mission for the exercise: to develop standing operating procedures (SOPs) for its transition to war and wartime operations. That document would be sent to other USAREUR-oriented MHDs for use as a model. Several factors, however, conspired to turn REFORGER 85 into a much broader vehicle to transform the entire USAREUR MHD program. The USAREUR Command Group showed great interest in the subject. Maj. Gen. Charles J. Fiala, USAREUR Chief of Staff, was particularly anxious that this opportunity to recast the program be fully utilized. General Fiala, as most senior USAREUR officers, was very concerned about integrating the U.S. Army effort in Europe into the overall NATO mission and structure. Quite naturally, he wanted our plans to provide historical coverage for NATO. He also had misgivings about the apparent slowness in existing plans for deploying MHDs to Europe and the rather small number of units available in the Reserve Component structure. The presence of several other MHDs in Europe for REFORGER presented a second opportunity. The lessons both the MHDs and the units they supported learned in the exercise could contribute significantly to the development of our wartime plans. The coalescence of these factors meant that the 116th MHD could make full use of its special skills and background by spending two to three weeks in close cooperation with the USAREUR Military History Office, the Chief of Staff's office, and other elements of the Command Group pounding out a realistic and workable wartime SOP for military history detachments deploying to Europe.

What, then, were the results of all this high-level interest, extensive staff discussion, and planning? Most immediately, the wartime SOP model was developed and is being staffed. It should be presented in detail during the MHD Training Workshop to be held this summer at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, but its major features can be outlined here.

Essentially, the plan stands upon the dual concepts of Theater Historian control and pooling. The

civilian Theater Historian will serve as the Center of Military History's agent and point of contact, and his office will provide technical supervision of all military history assets in the Theater Army. This conforms to current U.S. Army and NATO doctrine, and prevents many of the problems that arose out of lack of central control and uniformity in earlier wars. Pooling—and this was the principal contribution of the 116th MHD's work in Europe—will provide solutions to immediate shortages without the Korean War problem of over-centralized direction. During the initial stages of a European conflict, the handful of MHDs available will be held in pools at the equivalents of corps or field army headquarters. The Theater Historian will determine the dispatch of contact teams, not full MHDs, throughout the commands to conduct key activities on a priority basis, depending upon where the action is



116th MHD at USAREUR Headquarters, Heidelberg, West Germany.

or where something of historical value needs to be recorded. Although a real-world compromise, pooling has a number of advantages. It identifies those detachments that will work together in wartime and enables their training to be coordinated in peacetime. Pooling allows specialization; some MHDs will deal with tactical combat, some with logistics and support, and some with issues relating to combined and joint operations. It allows MHDs to gain working experience in peacetime exercises with the major headquarters they will support. Pooling will also foster teamwork within and between MHDs, something three wars have shown to be the only way small, highly technical units can function effectively.

Aside from the immediate plan, the exercise will have several long-range consequences. The planning revealed a serious shortage of historians in USAREUR during the early phases of a European

conflict, and the need for the Army to develop a new TOE to provide the standard MHD with more personnel to carry out its mission. USAREUR has proposed several CAPSTONE realignments that will better utilize scarce MHD resources. The command has requested that the detachments, especially the "controlling units," arrive earlier in the mobilization period than previously planned. And, perhaps most importantly, USAREUR is at all levels finally starting to plan realistically for the employment of MHDs in wartime and contingency operations.

The CAPSTONE Program is designed to encourage units to work together on a continuing basis. From the USAREUR perspective and quite aside from the groundwork laid for deploying military

history detachments in wartime, the most important lesson learned during the recent exercise was that the MHDs are valuable assets. The command intends to utilize them fully whenever they exercise in Europe. Initial reports from our major subordinate commands indicate that they were equally pleased with the MHDs assigned to them and that they will be working closely with them in the future. A process is underway that could lead to a realization of that fine balance that will allow the military history detachments successfully to serve two masters—the Center of Military History and the field commanders.

William Stacy, a staff historian in the USAREUR Military History Office, monitors the CAPSTONE Program as it is applied to military history detachments.

Military History in the ROTC

Roger Cirillo

Convincing professional historians that military history has a place in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps might at first blush seem as worthwhile as carrying coals to Newcastle. The English town is no longer the coal producer it once was, or so a British friend tells me, but what of the need to carry military history to the ROTC? The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command has institutionalized a military history instruction program through TRADOC Regulation 350-13, but its implementation, in both the letter and spirit of the regulation, rests in the hands and hearts of the implementers in the field.

Much of the responsibility for military history's having fallen into the doldrums in the 1970s, at least as far as the ROTC is concerned, can be attributed at all levels to the implementers. All too often, professors of military science were rated on enrollments, numbers of commissions awarded, and the comparative performances of MS III's (third-year cadets) at summer camp. To those of us at the lower levels of the system, the "objectives" by which we were managed seemed to neglect education for more easily quantifiable factors. It is not surprising that too many professors of military science ignored, shelved, and occasionally dropped military history for priorities of higher command interest.

Now, with the ROTC prospering as it hasn't for over a decade, part of its new look is to put

its curriculum back on track. Curing ROTC's ills in the area of military history, however, has turned into a continuing battle. Several initiatives to reverse the trends of the 1970s are being implemented. A revamped TRADOC regulation detailing responsibilities has been written, and there is heightened support from all levels of command, from the Secretary of the Army down to the ROTC Regions.

The Combat Studies Institute has produced a how-to-teach military history packet complete with lesson outlines for the non-historian Army officer teaching military history in the ROTC. Over a hundred copies in draft have been issued in response to requests by schools and instructors, part of a continuing policy to get needed materials into the field until the final product can be printed. Using the standard ROTC text, the Center of Military History's *American Military History*, as a basis, the packet assists the instructor in teaching a basic thirty-class-hour course, expandable to forty-five hours. Modules of varying length can be used to fill a normal three-credit-hour semester, allowing the instructor to tailor his course to local conditions. In addition, four military professional knowledge subjects are included as part of the forty-five hour course.

The establishment of the Combat Studies Institute's Military History Education Committee also provides a significant advance in supporting and monitoring ROTC as well as

branch school history instruction. The committee's five members are tasked not only with providing assistance to the field, but with conducting a military history instructor workshop for ROTC instructors assigned to teach military history.

The U.S. Military Academy at West Point continues to conduct its workshops for civilian military historians who teach in conjunction with ROTC detachments as members of their own academic institutions' history departments. The present regulation encourages the approach of having academic departments teach military history. Many detachments, however, continue to retain their own courses.

My first military history course was taught by Col. Samuel W. Patten, then a professor of military science at Syracuse University. He was a rare combination of model soldier and model scholar. Colonel Patten's course did for my classmates and me what TRADOC Regulation 350-13 today encourages: It taught us what the Army does and has done, how it has contributed to society, and its place in national affairs. Using the principles of war, we traced and did rough analyses of a dozen campaigns. We learned the bases of civil-military relations from George Washington's time, of the Army's peacetime contributions, and that for countless thousands it had been the true melting pot and avenue to citizenship.

Twelve years later, when I was myself an ROTC military history instructor, I tried to live up to the standards Patten had set. He operated according to two major tenets. The first was that cadets who demonstrate an interest in military history are usually the best recruiting candidates. They are likely to know what the Army is, what it does, and how it works, and will at least enter it understanding the requirements of the profession. His second tenet was that the study of the profession is the bedrock of officership. Few academics I have met could rival the breadth and depth of Colonel Patten's knowledge of military history; he had read it continuously since his graduation from West Point a quarter-century before. Because he had lived it so thoroughly, it was an easy concept for him to sell.

For teaching military history in an ROTC detachment, finding yourself a Sam Patten is a must. The prime requirements of the instructor are hard work, enthusiasm for the subject, and the desire to teach. Professors of military science will find a good military history program not only a boon to their detachments, but an

important contribution to each of their cadets' future professional development.

The ROTC military history program is gaining strength after a decade and a half of neglect and turbulent change. The program's success and ultimate survival, however, remain in the hands of the implementers.

Major Cirillo is a teaching fellow at the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Drums & Bugles Corner

This issue's selection of purple prose o'er scarlet battlefield:

Swifter than an eagle, stronger than a lion, was Turner Ashby that day. Arriving at the spot, he was not slow to see that hot work had been going on; but not meeting any one from whom to learn definitely what had taken place other than that a desperate fight had occurred, he pushed madly on the line of retreat taken by the enemy. Such was the impetuosity and rapidity of the movement, that he was not long in coming abreast of the enemy as they occupied Kelly's Island.... Discovering them just as they were in the act of firing, he rapidly wheeled his men off the track of the railroad, formed them under the cover of the embankment, and with a shout which made the woods ring, he cried out, "Charge them, men, and at them with your bowie-knives;" and then dashing his horse into the Potomac, closely followed by ten dauntless spirits, proceeded himself to obey the command. The fire which they now encountered was a close and heavy one, emptying two of the saddles, just as the little band reached the island. "Reserve your fire, men, and at them with your bowie-knives," cried the Colonel; "bring up the reserve and drive away at them." And at them they went. Such impetuosity and such dash were irresistible, and soon the Colonel saw the effect of his strategy and heroism in the blue backs of a retreating foe. Suspecting that some harm had befallen his brother, he fought with a terrible courage, and those who saw the wild glance of his eye and heard the shout of his "Charge them, boys, charge them!" will never, never forget it.... The Colonel, though always in the front, having emptied eleven out of twelve cylinders of his revolvers, killing three of his antagonists, escaped with only a slight wound upon the inner side of his leg from a ball which passed through his horse, but with which wound this high-mettled animal bore his noble rider through the fight, and at the close, when the welkin was ringing with the cheers of the little band of victorious Confederates, he (the high-mettled animal—Ed.) fell exhausted from the loss of blood. Fit requiem for such a noble animal.

James B. Avirett, *The Memoirs of General Turner Ashby and His Compeers* (Baltimore: Selby & Dulany, 1867), pp. 110-112.

A Message for Field Historians: Your Work is Important

Alfred Goldberg

The Army Historian continues here its series of guest contributions on the state of military history. The following essay is adapted from a talk delivered at the Sixth Biennial Army Historians Conference in February 1985. Dr. Goldberg is the Historian of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

At the Third Biennial Army Historians Conference in May 1979, I chaired a session on service historical programs and systems. I expressed my pleasure and satisfaction that the main emphasis of the papers was on field histories, which I considered most important and useful in the overall scheme of the services' historical programs. I was particularly struck by the remarks of the Marine Corps representative, who stressed the importance of the promotion of historical awareness as one of the duties of Marine Corps historians. The Marine historians must be very good at this, for surely this must be one of the reasons that the Marine Corps historical program is among the best-supported and most effective programs in government.

Throughout the historical programs of all the military services there should be a continuing effort to promote historical awareness and make available historical data of current utility and relevance. Field history programs can contribute much to this awareness. The more far-reaching the program, the more people are aware of it and perhaps the more disposed they are to make use of its products and services. The more people make use of history in the field, the more likely they are to be aware of it and to use it at the top commands and in Washington—when they get there. (And they do get there.) In this way, then, we can look on the field history programs in all of the services as a training ground for future leaders and staff officers in awareness of and employment of history in doing their jobs. If a sense of history is a good thing for anyone to acquire and cultivate, then it is a doubly good thing for our military and civilian leaders to have.

The military especially have an obligation to keep themselves and the public well-informed. The Defense Department has to be concerned about the historical record, and the authoritative record must be embodied in histories, not in public relations handouts. Make no mistake about the potential usefulness of your work. You are providing much of the underlying structure of the overall history of the Army and of the Defense Department. We histori-

ans have an obligation to keep the government and the public informed about what the government is doing. In the long run this is probably our most important function.

The potential utility of your histories is known to you. I can testify personally to the value of field histories. Historical studies produced in the military services at different levels have frequently helped save time, money, resources, and effort. Out of this massive production of paper, there emerges more than enough of instant and enduring value to justify all of the cost of the historical programs to the Army and to the whole Department of Defense.

We historians are often confronted with questions about the utility of what we do: What use is this historical program? What can it do for us? Does it have a payoff?

On several occasions, I have had to defend against enemies the existence of the Department of Defense historical program. And I use the term enemies advisedly. There are periodic attacks on the program from people—usually retired military officers (Is that significant?)—who write to the President of the United States or the Secretary of Defense urging the abolition of all military service historical programs because they are useless and a waste of money. The following is an example of the letters' intemperate tone and radical solutions:

Dear Mr. President:

I would like to suggest some areas in which the Defense budget might be reduced without affecting national security.

First, abolish the entire history structure....I can only extrapolate from limited personal knowledge, but a conservative estimation of the direct savings...would amount to \$15–20 million annually. Indirect savings... would substantially increase that figure.

Although the savings is (*sic*) modest relative to the entire Defense budget, it is one which could be realized with absolutely no effect on our defense posture. From personal experience, I know that annual histories are viewed as nothing but a vast nuisance by the vast majority of officers; the main exception being the few who have a vested interest in them. I doubt if there is a single commander in any service, at any level, who would not

elect to abolish his historical office if presented with that option or the alternative of cutting his operational personnel budget by the same amount. The very marginally useful information compiled in routine service histories could readily be provided by minor modifications in recordkeeping procedures, which would not require any additional personnel.

It became my lot to answer such letters or to draft the answers for someone else's signature. These exercises caused me to give serious thought to the values of the program and particularly those that are utilitarian as distinguished from humanistic. Since cost and payoff are major criteria of utility, I felt impelled to find and cite instances where the historical programs have saved the government money—enough money to pay for themselves. Army historians may be interested in how the Defense Department historical program has contributed to the better and more economical functioning of the military services and the government as a whole.

An example that is easiest to quantify involved me personally, and I offer it here because it is the most specific instance of estimated large dollar savings I know of. During the 1950s, I wrote a portion of Volume VI of the *Army Air Forces in World War II*, dealing with the logistical history of the AAF and including chapters on research and development and procurement. In preparing this work, I used documents, case histories, and studies from many levels. The field-level histories were especially useful in providing specific instances of procedures and practices.

About the time I had finished writing these chapters I was visited by a delegation of lawyers and intelligence officials from the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service. They wanted help in defending the government's interest in cases brought against it by almost all of the major aircraft companies that had produced aircraft for the Army Air Forces and the Navy during World War II. All of these companies—Boeing, Consolidated-Vultee, Douglas, Lockheed, Northrop, and others—were suing for the return of hundreds of millions of dollars paid by them in excess profits taxes.

The Treasury and IRS officials asked me whether the assumptions and data on which the aircraft companies based their suits were correct and supportable. I told them they were not. They asked, "How do you know?" I told them of my work on the history of the research and development and procurement of aircraft by the Army Air Forces. "Do you know where the documents are?" they asked—in chorus. I produced boxes of notes and selected the ones that were most significant in refuting the claims of the aircraft companies.

The case hinged on the aircraft companies' claims that they were entitled to return of excess

profits taxes because of the research and development costs they had incurred in developing the aircraft they produced during the war. Actually, in those days before World War II (when most of the planes were developed) the cost of research and development was amortized in the production contracts that the companies made with the AAF and the Navy. Moreover, the companies had made assertions relating to the size and timing of AAF aircraft programs that were refuted by the primary sources I had listed in my notes. The Treasury and IRS people read the chapters I had written and were elated, for they told a thoroughly documented and entirely different story from that of the aircraft companies.

Subsequently, I directed IRS researchers to the documents in the records center. On the instructions of the government lawyers, I made all the materials I had shown them available to the lawyers of the first of the aircraft companies coming up for trial—the Boeing Aircraft Corporation. Shortly after, two lawyers representing Boeing flew into Washington from Seattle to inspect my materials. After reading the chapters I had written, one said ruefully to the other, "There goes our case." And, indeed, the Boeing case never went to trial; it was settled out of court. Boeing received a payment of \$3 million instead of the \$150 million it had originally claimed. Sometime after, the Secretary of the Treasury wrote a letter to the Secretary of Defense notifying him that the Air Force Historical Office had probably saved the government an estimated \$70 million. He arrived at this figure by assuming on the basis of previous experience in such tax cases that the court would have awarded Boeing about half the amount it had claimed.

This case set the pattern for the rest of the aircraft company claims. Most of them capitulated and settled out of court for the same two or three cents on the dollar.

The government saved hundreds of millions of dollars on these cases because of historical data that Air Force historians provided. Whether the IRS itself could have performed the necessary research to find the right documents to defend the government is doubtful. It was fortuitous that I had completed my work before the cases came to trial, but it was not fortuitous that I was doing the work. It was a planned part of the AAF history and its historical significance was evident. It is true that we did not realize what a legal and financial service the history would also render. I felt that the savings to the government from these cases had paid for the entire cost of the Air Force historical program from its inception up to that time—and for some years beyond. So—history can pay its way.

Other instances of savings resulting from information and ideas supplied by historians of the military services are more difficult to quantify, but it is clear that savings did occur on many other occasions. The mere existence of historical studies, including case studies of the development of weapons and equipment, has undoubtedly saved untold years of research time by study groups. As is well-known, military services constantly conduct studies—thousands of them. They study strategies, tactics, weapon systems, organizational arrangements, operations, procedures, and what have you. They study them again and again. The investment of people, time, and money in such studies is enormous. To some extent, our historical work serves as a basic and organized body of knowledge available to all of these study groups. To the extent that our work is used by these groups, I believe that they save a great deal of time and money. Many study groups spend much effort developing the backgrounds of the subjects they are studying, and this often entails historical research. This makes it important—even imperative—that the military services be aware of the large body of organized historical information their historians have already prepared.

Most of the benefits the Defense Department derives from its historical program are qualitative rather than quantitative. No doubt some of these benefits have dollar payoffs, but it is difficult to come by any numbers, even approximate. Still, qualitative payoffs are often as important as quantitative ones—sometimes even more important. It is difficult to know just how large a part of any outcome, in the form of a study, a decision, or an action, was influenced by the historical input. Generally, we learn how much affect we have had only when we receive a judgment in the form of a testimonial or a letter of commendation. And even then we cannot know how much unless it is spelled out.

A couple of examples of historical work from which qualitative benefits have accrued to Defense agencies and the country come to mind. There are many others. Several years ago, the U.S. Army Center of Military History provided data on mine warfare which was of material use in the design of an innovative “family of scatterable mines”—a development that has revolutionized the entire concept of mine warfare. In another case, the Naval Historical Center some years ago provided the Navy and State Departments with Historical precedents supporting U.S. territorial claims against Canada in the Gulf of Maine/Georges Bank region—a major issue between the United States and Canada with important economic repercussions.

There is another category of historical support of importance to the government, to outside groups, and to individuals, involving the establishment of precise information about the past. All of the military service historical programs are concerned with these matters. The following examples give some indication of how important this information is to the people affected as well as to the government:

1. Establishment of combat credit for service in wartime.

2. Information on units and individuals participating in nuclear tests. The government is involved in claims and court cases involving many people—military and civilian—and a great deal of money is probably at stake. Also at stake are the futures of the many people who may have been affected by these tests.

3. Information on the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam. Here, too, the financial repercussions can be substantial for the claimants, although the manufacturers, not the government, are the defendants. It is important for proper adjudication of these claims that information be complete and accurate.

4. All of the military service historical offices are involved in providing support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Personnel Review Board in connection with determining whether to grant veteran status to certain groups that performed quasi-military service in World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. More than a hundred groups have applied for veteran benefits under Public Law 95-202 of November 23, 1977. The historical offices prepare reports assessing the extent to which these claims meet established criteria. The U.S. Army Center of Military History has in recent years written about twenty historical studies for the Board. One group that has been granted veteran status and thereby become eligible for a variety of benefits is the WASPS—the women auxiliary flyers of World War II.

The message that emerges from all these examples is that we should become more self-conscious about what we are doing and how it may be used in practical and beneficial ways by our services, commands, and units. You should be aware of what is happening in your organization—its problems, issues, and procedures—and examine whether what you have done or are doing might be of help in your organization’s planning and operations. And remember that “knowledge rests not upon truth alone, but upon error also.”

Our histories and other products have their greatest practical value in use by others—and especially in purposeful use by our own services and the government. Our work has values, humanistic values,

that go beyond that—but certainly their greatest utility is in-house. Be prepared to call meaningful and suggestive information and ideas that have emerged from your work to the attention of those who might be interested in and might benefit from them. In short, one of your prime missions ought to be to promote the value of historical knowledge in as constructive and professional a manner as you can. You owe it to yourself, to history, and to your organization. If you achieve nothing more than to help others become aware of and develop a sense of history, you will have accomplished much.

We military historians are engaged in preserving and disseminating the record of the national military history—a task “that may be called without apology an integral part of the national defense.” But we also have a duty to serve the present and future, and this

is especially true of those of us who are government historians. The chief use of a knowledge of the past is to equip us for the present, and the “best of prophets of the future is the past.”

Be assured. You historians in the field are not forgotten. Your efforts are known and appreciated. They can and have made a difference. Beyond the humanistic values of your profession—and they alone would be sufficient reason for the existence of government historical programs—you Army historians have demonstrated that you can serve the utilitarian needs of a great, pragmatic institution. You can look to the future in the knowledge that your work will endure. In the age of the throwaway and instant everything, that is a great deal more than most members of our society can know.

PRACTICING THE HISTORIAN'S CRAFT

The MacArthur Papers

Edward J. Boone, Jr.

Today the guns are silent. A great tragedy has ended. A great victory has been won....

With these words, General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, opened his remarks at the surrender ceremonies aboard the U.S.S. *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945. The original draft of his speech is kept with the rest of General MacArthur's papers at the MacArthur Memorial Archives in Norfolk, Virginia.

The family of Douglas MacArthur had connections with Norfolk dating to the early 1800s, when his maternal grandfather, Thomas Hardy, took up residence in the busy port of Hampton Roads. MacArthur's parents married in Norfolk. Recognizing the historical link, MacArthur dedicated a small park on the site of the Hardy home in 1951—the first of a chain of events that would lead to the establishment of the MacArthur Memorial and its archives.

In 1961, General MacArthur executed a deed of gift assigning a considerable portion of his estate, including his official papers of over two million documents, to the City of Norfolk. He also declared his intention to be buried in the building the city offered as a museum and place of interment: the 1847 classic revival courthouse designed by Thomas U. Walter. The city agreed to maintain the

memorial, and in January 1964 the remodeled building opened. Three months later the general's remains were interred beneath its rotunda.

When General MacArthur made his gift to Norfolk, the Army released his papers to the city, and Norfolk employed a professional archivist to organize, inventory, and maintain them. The MacArthur Memorial Foundation constructed an administration and archives building, including a storage vault and a library, in 1967. In the mid-1960s, the bulk of the collection was still classified; today only a handful remain so, and even these are accessible to researchers with appropriate clearances.



The MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia.



General MacArthur signs the Japanese surrender document, September 2, 1945.

Douglas MacArthur's papers form the heart of the archives. The majority of the documents, with certain important exceptions, covers the period from July 1941 to April 1964. Among the papers are captured documents, intelligence summaries, operation orders, public statements and speeches, personal correspondence, extensive official correspondence, and the handwritten manuscript of *Reminiscences*, MacArthur's autobiography.

Major portions of the collection deal with the occupation of Japan. By 1975, interest in this subject had become so intense that the MacArthur Memorial and the MacArthur Memorial Foundation began a series of symposia on the occupation. Old Dominion University has since joined as a sponsor. The sixth symposium, entitled "The Occupation of Japan: Arts and Culture," was held in Norfolk in October 1984. The proceedings of these conferences, recognized as among the leading forums for occupation studies, have been published regularly about a year after each of the gatherings.

The archives also hold the papers of several of General MacArthur's associates, including Generals Courtney Whitney, Charles A. Willoughby, and H. E. Eastwood. Also maintained are the papers of Colonels Weldon Rhoades, C. E. Skoglund, and other officers. A photo library of over 10,000 prints and slides is in constant demand.

The archives' staff is currently working on additions to the collection. The papers of Richard K. Sutherland, MacArthur's Chief of Staff in the Pacific, are being copied at the National Archives. Recently, a batch of pre-1941 material, mostly per-

sonal and official MacArthur correspondence, has been located, copied, and stored in Norfolk. A continual search is underway for material related to General MacArthur, especially for the Japan years, 1945-1951.

At present, the archives of the MacArthur Memorial are organized into thirty-one record groups, most centered upon the papers (including photographs) of Douglas MacArthur. A library of 4,000 books the general gave the City of Norfolk has been supplemented by gifts from the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, from authors of books on MacArthur and his activities, and by purchases.

There are finding aids of various levels of detail for all record groups: preliminary inventories, box and descriptive inventories, card catalogs for major items, and a card catalog for photographs. More indexing is required for the 193 boxes of the general's personal correspondence.

Some funding is being obtained to microfilm the archives' entire holdings. This two- to three-year project will be conducted in coordination with the City of Norfolk, which will share equipment and personnel with the Memorial. Modest research grants for study at the archives are available from the MacArthur Memorial Foundation. Those interested in applying for a grant or using the archives' resources should contact the Archivist at the MacArthur Memorial, MacArthur Square, Norfolk, Virginia 23510.

Edward Boone is the Archivist of the MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia.

PROFESSIONAL READING

Recent American Books on Military History

The American Historical Association was recently asked to make recommendations for displays of books by American authors at the Colloquy of the International Commission of Military History and the International Congress of Historical Sciences, both to be held in Stuttgart, West Germany, in August 1985. In this connection, a group at the Center of Military History developed a list of about fifty American works on military, naval, and air history. The last congress having been held in 1980, the group confined its list to works published in the period 1980-1985. The compilers adopted a broad view of the history of war and attempted to prepare a representative list. The results are presented here in the hope that they might prove useful as a guide for reading. Comments, including suggestions for additions or subtractions, are invited.

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AT THE CENTER

Army Historians Conference

The Center held the Sixth Biennial Army Historians Conference at the Crystal City Marriott, Arlington, Virginia, on February 19-22. The conference, the theme of which was "A Reevaluation of the Command History Program," had an estimated attendance of 184.

Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr., opened the proceedings with a delivery emphasizing leadership. The agenda included presentations by Alfred Goldberg, Historian of the Office of the Sec-

retary of Defense, who spoke on the concrete contributions historians have made to military programs, and by Maj. Gen. J. M. Woodmansee, Jr., Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Force Development, who provided an update on his office's activities and the role history plays in them. (A version of Dr. Goldberg's presentation appears as the Perspective section in this issue of *TAH*.) Martin Blumenson, a former military history detachment commander and Center historian, was the banquet speaker, sharing reflections and reminiscences of a career in military history.

A working session entitled "What's Going On at the Center?" briefed the attendees on Center activities, principally progress toward realization of a National Museum of the United States Army, work on the U.S. Army in Vietnam series of books, and increased Center emphasis on analysis. One on the Air Force's new Career Historian Personnel System provided an example of recruitment and career development in a service historical program. The session entitled "Our Academic Brothers—Their Missions, Our Relationships" featured presentations by historians from the U.S. Military Academy, the Army War College, and the Command and General Staff College on the roles military history plays in their institutions. The session on intercommand relationships dealt with the Center's obligations to commanders, commands' obligations to the Center, and the roles of major subordinate commands. This session's presentations and subsequent discussions emphasized the need for timely Center acknowledgement and evaluation of command histories, and for increased communications between the commands and the Center, to include more frequent

staff visits each way. The question of whether the Center should prescribe the precise location of an historical office within an Army staff was a point at issue, with a general consensus favoring a mission-order approach. The session on the Annual Historical Review, with the presentations "Its Purpose and Does It Fill It," "Perceptions of the AHR in the Supported Commands," and "Alternative Means," examined the document's usefulness and means of preparing it from a variety of angles. A majority of the historians present saw the Annual Historical Review as the cornerstone of the Army Command History Program. During the conference, there were concurrent meetings of military history detachments.

Concluding discussions dealt with ways in which the Center could be of greater service to the field, and the attendees provided written comments on evaluation sheets. There was a consensus that the biennial conferences served what was a pressing need—increased communications between the Center and the field.

COMMENTARY AND EXCHANGE

To the editors:

Having just read No. 6 of *The Army Historian*, I think you ought to be very pleased with the way this effort is shaping up. If there were any doubts, I would have thought that the letters of Cols. Bittner, Newell, and Taylor in that issue would have greatly reassured you that you do indeed have an audience "out there." Keep at it—in time you will have a large one.

While I am at it, the response to Col. Bittner's letter was a model of its kind.

William R. Emerson
Director
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
Hyde Park, New York

To the editors:

As a life-long student of military history and an active Army Infantry officer, I have followed the evolution of *The Army Historian* with great interest.

I would like to throw out some thoughts provoked by Dr. Wright's excellent article, "Clio in Combat," in the Winter 1985 issue. It seems to me that there are two basic explanations for most of the problems he outlined. The first is the lack of clearly defined staff positions/relationships for military history detachments. The second is the inability of MHDs to "prove their worth" to all of the staffs and commanders of the units to which they have been assigned.

I submit the following points for consideration: 1) Military history can provide critical, timely assistance to the commanders and staffs of Army combat units. 2) These units would not only use, but *demand* military history support if the utility of such support could be demonstrated to them.

Although it will probably seem heretical to some in these times of tight manpower and budget ceilings, I would propose that a permanent two- to three-man MHD be installed at each division and higher-level headquarter

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ters. The detachment would work directly under the chief of staff. The Center of Military History would provide overall Army-wide coordination of their activities.

In wartime, of course, the MHDs would perform their traditional functions. However, I submit that the MHDs have as much—if not more—to offer the Army in peacetime. Essentially, the peacetime mission of the MHDs would be fourfold: 1) Provide a nucleus for wartime expansion of MHDs. 2) Habituate commanders and staffs at all levels to their presence, activities, and methods. 3) Allow the MHDs to refine their skills through actual peacetime maneuvers. (They could, for example, accompany brigades to the NTC.) 4) Provide historical analyses and background information in support of operational planning and training.

In my opinion, item 4 is the most crucial and merely formalizes what commanders and staffs at all levels *should* be doing, but rarely have the time for, i.e., examining the historical record for assistance in planning operations, developing doctrine, etc. The in-depth historical data that would be provided by these MHDs could go a long way toward helping units avoid the "reinvention-of-the-wheel" syndrome. It could help prevent the following of doctrinal dead ends based on conclusions drawn from superficial reviews of the historical record. It could provide units being deployed to new training environments (e.g., desert, arctic, jungle) with experience data that would be almost impossible to obtain any other way. Ultimately, I would like to see MHDs providing "historical estimates" and "historical annexes" for the commanders and staffs of as many brigade and higher units as their time would allow.

Some examples of units that could particularly benefit from this sort of support would be the High-Tech Test Bed at Fort Lewis, Washington; the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord, California, as it develops new Light-Infantry Doctrine; and the two new Light Divisions (the 6th and 10th).

The MHDs could also help capture and disseminate the tremendous amount of "lessons learned" information that is floating around the Army. One personal example that comes to mind is a formal field test I attended of small-arms ammunition affects against different types of snow fortifications. The results were eye-opening and we were told that they would be incorporated into new edi-

tions of our fields manuals. That was eight years ago, and I find that our most current Northern Operations Manuals still contain data that I saw disproved. MHDs could provide a tremendous service if they captured even a fraction of such information.

By way of conclusion, I will throw out one more personal anecdote. While I was a lieutenant in the summer of 1979, my battalion, 4/9th Infantry (MANCHUS) at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, was tasked to conduct three week-long tests of a proposed mountain ARTEP. The mountains we operated in were roadless and extremely rugged. In preparation, I dug out all my books on the Italian campaigns of World War II, since it seemed to me that the weather and terrain we were moving in would do two things: eliminate our helicopter support for extended periods, and reduce us to World War II-era technology and methods. The answer—which, due to the time involved, would not have helped us that summer—appeared to be mules or burros. After all, I reasoned, the Swiss still used them. Suffice it to say, my proposal was not well received. I believe that a formalized MHD system such as I have proposed could have done a great deal that summer.

There is a lot more flesh to put on the bones of this framework, and I would hope that this letter, if published, will spark some debate. I can sum up my entire argument quite simply by saying that military history should be considered a "combat multiplier." The fact that it is not so considered is a measure of the tremendous amount of educating that needs to be done.

Capt. Gary R. Hovatter
Asst. Prof. of Military Science
Eastern Oregon State College
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Readers are invited to express their opinions on this publication and its featured articles, as well as to share their experiences and views on topics relating to the study, use, and teaching of military history. Correspondence should be addressed to the Editors, The Army Historian, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20314-0200.

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